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BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NO. 16620

ELWOOD L. NIELSEN, dba
NIELSEN'S CONSTRUCTION CO.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
CHIN-HSIEN WANG and
LI RONG WANG,
Defendants-Respondents.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a breach of contract action brought by
both parties against each other for damages arising from
the construction of respondents' house.
DISPOSITION BELOW
This matter was heard by the Honorable Dean E.
Conder, sitting as the trier of fact.

After a three day

trial, the court found that appellant breached the contract and was liable in damages to respondents.

Appel-

lant's motion for a new trial was denied.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents request that the judgment of the
district court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about April 20, 1977, the appellant and
respondents entered into a written contract wherein the
appellant agreed to construct a house on respondents'
lot for an agreed upon contract price of $76,000.00.
The contract provided, among other things, that any

change orders were to be in writing and signed by the
parties.

In addition, in the event of breach, the

breaching party would pay the attorney's fees of the
nonbreaching party.

(R.P. 380-381, P's Exh.4).

The price bid by the appellant to build respondents' house was based upon a set of plans that were
later rejected by the building inspector's office of Salt
Lake City because of noncompliance with building and
zoning laws.

Thereafter, the plans were revised to com-

ply with the requirements of the building and zoning laws.
The parties met and agreed to the building of the house
in compliance with the revised plans.

(R.P. 371, 416-417)

Appellant, an experienced builder, knew the
plans were modified and signed the plans, saying he would
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build the house according to the modified plans. (R.P.
289, 327-329).

During the course of construction, appel-

lant did not present any change orders indicating that
there were any changes in the construction between the
two sets of plans, or indicating that the contract price
for building the house under the revised set of plans
would be any different than the contract price for
ing the house under the original set of plans.
305, 330, 521).

build~

(R.P.

Even though the.re were other changes

made in the contract during the course of construction
(P's Exh. 5 and 6), no demands were made on respondents
to pay more than the contract price of $76,000.00 until
the respondents were about to move into the house on
December 31, 1977.

At that time, appellant through his

agent, LaMont Nielsen, demanded that respondents sign an
agreement to pay $12,543.37 for "extras." (P's Exh. 10).
Respondents refused to sign the agreement, maintaining
that most of the items were not extras.
The only changes ordered by respondents for
which they were liable were additional heating runs, a
butcher block, extra carpet and light fixtures, and a
stained glass window, for a total cost of $1,523.37.
The other items claimed by appellant to have been extras
were contained in the original contract price bid by
appellant to the respondents.

(R.P. 204-205).
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The appellant did not complete the house on
the date set for completion.

An

addendum to the con-

tract provided that a $40.00 per day penalty would be
paid by appellant if the house were not completed by
December 15, 1977.

(P's Exh. 5).

On December 31, 1977,

the appellant abandoned the contract before the house
was completed pursuant to the terms of the agreement of
the parties.

Thereafter, the respondents were required

to complete the house through their own labors, in
obtaining subcontractors and performing services in
completing the house following the abandonment of the
contract by appellant.

(R.P. 551-553).

Following the abandonment of the contract by
appellant, the respondents were required to engage subcontractors to perform a number of services in completing and repairing work left undone by appellant.

The

cost to respondents of repairing and completing
appellant's work was $12,815.34.

(R.P. 205-206).

One of the terms of the parties' contract
required appellant to protect respondents against any
lien claims and to promptly pay and discharge any such
liens.

Because of appellant's refusal to pay his sub-

contractors and filing his own lien, numerous liens were
filed against respondents' house.

(R.P. 206-207).
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-5Due to appellant's breach of contract it was
necessary for respondents to retain legal counsel to
represent them in actions by the subcontractors and
appellant,

By the terms of the parties' contract,

appellant as the breaching party was required to pay
respondents' attorney's fees.

(P's Exh. 4).

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT SUBSTITUTE ITS IDEA

OF THE FACTS FOR THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT WHERE THERE IS
SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL
COURT'S JUDGMENT
After a three day trial and a hearing on a
motion for a new trial, appellant now asks this Court to
reweigh the facts as contained in the 592 pages of the
record and more than 55 exhibits, and substitute its
idea of the facts for that of the trial court.

In

asking this Court to reweigh the evidence, appellant -is
also asking that this Court abandon its long standing
policy of not disturbing the findings and judgments of
trial courts when those findings and judgments are based
on substantial, competent evidence.

Fisher v. Taylor,

572 P.2d 393 (Utah 1977).
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The factual issues before the trial court were
clear: l.

Was there a contract?

breached?

3.

2.

Was the contract

What were the damages flowing from the

Appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence

breach?

on these issues to have the court rule in his favor.

By

contrast, respondents produced a preponderance of evidence on these issues and the court ruled in their
fa¥er,

'!'be court was fully aware of the evidence and

til!lillerated over a week before preparing a memorandum
deci.sion.

Appellant has failed to show any error by the

trial court that would require this Court to reverse or
lllCldify the judgment.
Appellant's memorandum, and argument in
support of his motion for a new trial were substantially
the same argument as contained in his appeal brief.

The

trial court was fully apprised of the facts when it
denied appellant's motion for a new trial.
With two unsuccessful attempts at producing
sufficient evidence to persuade the trier of fact, appellant now approaches this Court for a third attempt at
arguing factual issues decided by the trial court.

It

would be a grave injustice to the respondents and the
trial court to reweigh the evidence where, as here, the
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-7record shows that the findings and judgment of the trial
court were based on substantial, ~ompetent evidence.
II.

THE THRUST OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT IS

THAT HE IS NOT HAPPY WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF THE FACTS
A.

Appellant is not entitled to the contract

price where he failed to complete the contract.
Appellant contends in his first argument that
he is entitled to what it cost him to build the house,
or in the very least, the.contract price.

Respondents

agree that the contract price for the house was
$76,000.00.

However, it does not follow that appellant

is entitled to that amount.

It is clear from the

testimony at trial that respondents were obligated to
pay appellant the contract price if the house was
completed in conformity with the plans.

No principle of

law forces a party to a contract to pay the contract
price when the other party fails to fully perform.

The

court found that the appellant did not complete the
contract and as a result was not entitled to the
contract price.
Appellant agreed to build the respondents a
house for $76,000.00.

Whether it cost appellant that

amount to build the house or cost him a million dollars
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to build it, is immaterial.

The evidence showed that

the appellant failed to complete the house as agreed.
Because of that failure, appellant was not entitled to
r~ve

the contract price.

Guen~ewig,

Watson Lumber Co. v.

79 Ill. App. 2d 377, 226 N.E.2d 270, 279

(1967).
As
~ ~

't

s JS

a '

an additional ground for not awarding appel-

balance of contract price, the trial court
IDt: to reward respondents anything for their

"pep

i.a acting as their own general contractor.

cour.t merely
~ .. -,amount

of~set

the value of respondents' services

that remained unpaid on the contract at

the time appellant abandoned the contract.
m~~r

The

This subject

was discussed by the court and counsel at the

hear:in9 of appellant's motion for a new trial.
B.

The trial court did not err in awarding

damages for appellant's failure to use the materials
specified in the plans.
Appellant misses the issue that was before the
trial court as it pertained to the award of damages for
aluminum siding.

The issue of the aluminum siding was

not whether the plans called for it or not, but rather,

red by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library S
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whe the r appellant was liable for failing to use the
materials specified in the plans.
As the evidence at trial showed, the plans
called for a prefinished hardwood board, a material
which would require little or no painting.

Appellant

used a different material than called for in the plans
and which required painting.

The material was of such a

nature that appellant's own subcontracter would not
paint it.

(R.P. 527-528, D's Exh. 18).
Faced with the problem of tearing out the

substitute material and replacing it with the material
specified in the plans, and the option of covering the
substitute material with aluminum siding (which would
require no painting), the respondents chose the more
economical option of merely covering the substitute
material with aluminum siding.

Had respondents chosen

to replace the substitute material, the cost would have
been even greater, since the material was already part
of the house.
Since appellant breached the contract by
failing to use the materials designated in the plans, it
follows that appellant is liable for damages in correcting the defect.

Accordingly, the court found that
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-10appellant was liable to respondents for the cost of the

'.

aawninum siding.

~~;,: .w

~l;>'

• -· l·

c.

j,-

The trial court did not err in allowing

ll'SDS Mr.

'sif ~--

Wang to testify as the owner of the house

9eneral contractor •
In Anderson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,

f·.

~-~--;·_• ;a5"1d·~ 101 (Utah 1978), this Court held that an owner

"f,

~;,

r:.\" ·~

~,~·; .,

_.,. MCU!f as to the value of his property and that his
tblllll•lll. .•rr should be given such weight and credibility as

•

¥Je~

of fact finds reasonable under the circumstan-

. . . , .....~ '!'~ ljt-"l

'!'ti!

-~,,..

As the owner of the house, and as the general

~r~or

who obtained subcontractors to complete the

~-jlfter

appellant breached and abandoned the

.....~t, respondent Mr. Wang was competent to testify
~i'~'

the cost of complefing and repairing the work

~lant

left unfinished or in a defective condition.

Mii;:-, ,f11an9 1 s testimony as to the cost of these repairs was
based upon h_is knowledge of what he paid to have the
repairs done or what bids subcontractors gave him.
(R.~.

527-538, 547-551).

During Mr. Wang's testimony

concerning the cost of completion and repairing defects,
appellant's attorney did not object.,

Having waived his
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right to object to the admission of the evidence, appellant cannot now assert that an error was made.
In addition to failing to object to Mr. Wang's
testimony as to the cost of completion and repair, appellant failed to produce any evidence on the items he now
disputes.

Appellant states at page 13 of his brief that

the trial court awarded respondents $550.00 to repair
the stained glass window.

The $550.00 award was to

repair both the stained glass window that had to be
replaced because it was installed inside out and destroyed
by the elements and the skylite window.

The oourt also

ordered respondents to pay $550.00 for the stained glass
window itself, thereby requiring respondents to pay for
the window as an extra and then allowing an offset in an
equal amount for its replacement due to appellant's
unworkmanlike installation, resulting in the window's
destruction.
II I.

APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY

ADDITIONAL AMOUNTS FOR EXTRAS NOT GRANTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT
Appellant contends that respondents should be
required to pay for extras in an amount of over
$12,000.00.

The only reason appellant gives for this

contention is that he put that amount of materials and
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-12labor into the house that were above the contract price.
Pa~agraph
th~

7 of the contract provides that any changes to

contract are to be in writing, signed by the parties

-;.~@.set

out the changes and adjustments to the contract

tr:~ce.

The evidence before the trial court clearly
showed that appellant did not present any change orders
or otberwise indicate to respondents that the contract
. . . . . . . . to be greater than the agreed upon amount of
llM; . . . . . . . 00.

...,aered

The court found that the only extras

by respondents or received by them for which

they were liable, were additional heating runs, a
butcher block, extra carpet and light fixtures, and a
stained glass window, for a total cost of $1,523.37.
In denying appellant's request for over
$12,000.00 in alleged extras, the trial court merely
followed the contract of the parties and the general
rule that a stipulation in a private building or construction contract that extras must be ordered in
writing is valid and binding upon the parties.

As long

as such a provision remains in effect, no recovery can
be had for extras done without a written order in
compliance therewith.

2 A.L.R.3d 620.
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-13In Watson Lumber Co. v. Guennewig, 79 Ill.
App. 2d 377, 226 N.E.2d 270 (1967), the court was faced
with a very similar problem to the issue of extras in
the present action.

There, the contractor claimed a

right to extra compensation for over 48 items of labor
and materials.

The contractor had a complete knowledge

of the plans and prepared the contract price with the
plans in mind. In reversing the trial court's award to
the contractor of $27,500.00 in extras, the appellate
court noted that the burden of proof was on the
contractor to show by clear and convincing evidence the
following elements:

(1) the·work was outside the scope

of his contract promises; (2) the extra items were
ordered by the owner; (3) the owner agreed to pay extra,
either by his words or conduct; (4) the extras were not
furnished by the contractor as his voluntary act; and
(5) the extra items were not rendered

nec~ssary

by any

fault of the contractor.
In Watson Lumber as in the present case, the
contractor did not request any payment for the extras
until he requested the balance of the contract price,
and claimed the home was complete.

Since the contractor

assumed the risk of building the owners' house at a
fixed price, he could not recover for extras on discovering he made a mistake on his estimate or that the work
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was more difficult than he anticipated.
~tractor

Because the

failed to prove by clear and convincing evi-

ID!noe that he was entitled to extras, the appellate
C9111~
~,

reversed the trial court's decision.

In addition,

appellate court rejected the contractor's argument

~~t_he
~

was entitled to the full contract price even
the house was not completed.

In rejecting this

it clear that in order to

• Q4
~

<the full contract price, the contract had to be
performed.

similarly in the present case, appellant has

,:> "-

•····

~led
:"'"-."

in its burden to prove that respondents were

liable for additional extras than the court awarded him.
~~ant

~il

did not make a demand for the alleged extras

the day respondents were to move into the house.

~dents

fo~

have vigorously denied that they were liable

any extras not ordered by the court.

Based upon the

Watson Lumber case and the failure of appellant to show
he was entitled to additional extras, it is clear that
the trial court did not err in failing to award appellant anything for his alleged additional extras.
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UNDER THE PARTIES' CONTRACT, RESPONDENTS

ARE ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE IN DEFENDING
THIS APPEAL
The contract of the parties provided that in
the event of a breach, the breaching party was required
to pay to the other party all damages incurred, including a reasonable attorney's fee.

Pursuant to this con-

tractual provision, the trial court awarded respondents
$7,500.00 in attorney's fees.
Since respondents have been forced to defend
this appeal, they should be entitled to a reasonable
attorney's fee for this case on appeal.

A majority of

modern courts who have specifically dealt with this
issue have allowed attorney's fees on appeal.

In

~

Jones Construction Co. v. Duncan Crane & Rigging, Inc.,
2 Wash. App. 509, 468 P.2d 699 (1970), a contractor sued
its subcontractor for damages resulting from breaqh of
,

the subcontract.

The court reasoned that since the

contract provided for a recovery of attorney's fees, it
followed that a reasonable attorney's fee must be
allowed for legal services on appeal.
Similarly in another action for breach of a
construction contract, Mersnon Gimeno Construction Co.
v. Robinson, 534 P.2d 635 (Colo. App. 1975), the court
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-16~

additional attorney's fees incurred to the

~~ling

party who had to defend the judgment of the

·ttRel court.
~,·e

For examples of other cases allowing

fees on appeal where the contract provides

!lC;

a~\qrney's

iJif·!

.}'7 •~2d

~ i~~

-...~

fees, see Steele v. Vanderslice, 90 Ariz.
636 (1961); Wilson v. Wilson, 54 Cal. 2d

P.2d 725, 5 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1960); 52 A.L.R.2d

..
Although this Court has held that attorney's

."°~·~al
•:1M$.f.~

•

~9ij:5),

in light of the position of the majority of

a.!dopt the majority position on this issue.

~,if

this Court adheres to its decision in Swain,

~ ~ts
OQ.~rt;.

& Investment Co., 3 Utah 2d 121, 279 P. 2d

oaurts, it is respectfully submitted that this

·~

'!Pf~

are discretionary, Swain v. Salt Lake

of this case make it a proper one for the

to award attorney's fees to respondent on this

appeal, if respondents prevail.
CONCLUSION
In reviewing appeals from trial court findings
and judgments this Court has wisely refused to disturb
them when they are based on substantial, competent evidence.

Appellant has failed to show that there was not
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-17such evidence to support the judgment of the trial
court.
The trial court's judgment was based on substantial, competent evidence and for the reasons stated
herein, that judgment should be affirmed and the case
remanded to the trial court for a determination of
respondents' attorney's fees in defending this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

J)~s-,~

/WENDELL E. BENNET'!'
Attorney for Respondents
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